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Abstract
The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their
potential role in the evolution of speciﬁcally human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of
human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an eval-
uation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a suﬃcient basis for the
forms of agentive understanding and shared intentionality involved in cooperative collective actions. On the other hand, we will also
argue that mirror neurons can nevertheless play an important role in an account of the production and understanding of joint action,
insofar as they provide the basic constituents of implicit agent-neutral representations and are useful elements in a process of online
mutual adjustment of participants’ actions.
 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In 1988, GiacomoRizzolatti andmembers of his research
team in Parma showed that neurons in area F5 in the mon-
key ventral premotor cortex do not code elementary move-
ments but goal-related actions (Rizzolatti, Carmada,
Gentilucci, Luppino, &Matelli, 1988). They also discovered
among F5 neurons a class of visuomotor neurons that ﬁre
both when the monkey observes an action performed by
another individual and when it executes the same or a simi-
lar action. These neurons became known as mirror neurons
(MNs). There is also now strong indirect evidence in favor of
the existence of mirror neuron systems in humans.
The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a num-
ber of interpretations of their functions together with specu-
lations on their potential role in the evolution of speciﬁcally
human capacities. Thus, MNs have been thought to ground
many aspects of human social cognition, such as under-
standing of action and intentional agency (Gallese, 2003a;
Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti,
Fogassi, &Gallese, 2001), imitation (Gallese, 2003a; Rizzol-
atti et al., 2001; Wohlschlager & Bekkering, 2002), empathy
(Gallese, 2001, 2003b), mind-reading (Gallese, 2003a; Gal-
lese & Goldman, 1998) and the emergence of language
(Arbib, 2002, 2003; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).
In this paper we will focus on action understanding and
its relevance to joint action. We will defend two main
claims. Our ﬁrst claim, against maximalist interpretations
of what MNs are for, is that MNs do not provide by them-
selves a suﬃcient basis for an (implicit) understanding of
intentional agency. Our second claim is that, by providing
the basic constituents of implicit agent-neutral representa-
tions, MNs may nevertheless play an important role in
the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions
and to understand them.
In Section 1, we brieﬂy review the main empirical evi-
dence for the existence of MNs in monkeys and humans.
Section 2 examines two competing interpretations of these
data and introduces two important distinctions relevant to
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their assessment: the distinction between informational
content and representational content and the distinction
between self-reference and self-relativity. In Section 3, we
argue that it is necessary to distinguish between at least
four levels of action understanding (perceptual understand-
ing, motor understanding, agentive understanding and
meta-representational understanding). We also claim that
mirror neurons underlie motor understanding but that fur-
ther mechanisms and processes are required to explain
agentive understanding. In Sections 4 and 5, we turn to
joint action. We ﬁrst examine some standard philosophical
analyses of joint actions and the diﬃculties they are con-
fronted with in accounting for their essential cooperative
dimension. We argue that cooperative joint actions require
from the participating agents the capacity to form agent-
neutral representations of the instrumental (means-end)
structure of these actions and to use them to control their
execution. We further argue that the mirror system already
provides the basic constituents of implicit agent-neutral
representations and we sketch a model in which the essen-
tial cooperative features of joint actions are taken into
account at the most basic level.
2. What are mirror neurons?
In a series of single neuron recording experiments on
macaque monkeys, Rizzolatti and his colleagues investi-
gated the functional properties of neurons in area F5, the
rostralmost sector of the ventral premotor cortex that con-
trols hand and mouth movements. A fundamental func-
tional property of area F5 is that most of its neurons do
not discharge in association with elementary movements
but are active during purposeful object-oriented actions,
such as grasping, tearing, holding or manipulating objects.
Although the majority of neurons in F5 are purely motor
neurons, area F5 also contains two classes of visuomotor
neurons: canonical neurons and mirror neurons.
Canonical neurons are activated during the execution of
goal-related movements and also discharge during object
observation, typically showing congruence between the
type of grip they motorically code and the size/shape of
the object that visually drives them. Mirror neurons are
activated both during the execution of purposeful, goal-
related hand actions, and when the monkey observes simi-
lar hand actions performed by another agent. In a recent
series of experiments, a proportion of mirror neurons were
also found to respond not only when the monkey executes
or observes an action but also when it hears that same
action performed by another agent. These ‘‘audio-visual
mirror neurons’’ do not only respond to the sound of
actions, they also discriminate between the sounds of diﬀer-
ent actions (Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002). Nei-
ther the sight of the other agent alone nor the sight of the
object alone are eﬀective in evoking mirror neurons’
responses. Similarly, mimicking the action without a target
object or performing the action by using tools are much
less eﬀective in evoking responses.
In one third of the mirror neurons, the congruence
between the visual and motor responses is strict, e.g. a neu-
ron will only discharge when a precision grip is executed or
observed. In two thirds of the neurons, the congruence is
broad, e.g. the neuron’s visual response will be elicited by
observed actions similar but not identical to the executed
actions it also codes for. Broadly congruent neurons
appear to generalize across diﬀerent ways of achieving
the same goal. It should also be noted that in some cases,
there is congruence in a logical or causal sense, rather than
according to sameness of goal. Thus, Fogassi and Gallese
(2002) give the example of a neuron that responded when
the monkey observed the experimenter placing a piece of
food on a tray and when the monkey grasped the same
piece of food, where the two actions can be considered part
of a logical sequence.
One important question concerns the source of
the visual input to F5 mirror neurons. There is a striking
resemblance between mirror neurons and neurons in the
anterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (STSa)
described by Perrett and co-workers, in particular a class
of cells that are selectively responsive to hand-object inter-
actions, such as reaching for, retrieving, manipulating,
picking, tearing and holding (Perrett et al., 1989). These
STS-neurons could provide a particularly well-suited
source of visual input to F5 mirror neurons. One problem
though is that area F5 does not receive direct projections
from the STS region. However, visual information could
be fed to area F5 from STSa through an intermediate step
in the posterior parietal cortex, in particular area 7b or PF
in the inferior parietal lobule. Indeed, researchers from the
Parma group have recently found neurons with ‘‘mirror
properties’’ in area 7b (Fogassi, Gallese, Fadiga, & Rizzol-
atti, 1998; Gallese, Ferrari, & Umilta`, 2002).
Single neuron recording is an invasive technique not
used in humans. Several studies using diﬀerent methodolo-
gies have nevertheless yielded converging evidence for the
existence of a similar mirror matching system in humans
(for a review, see Rizzolatti, Craighero, & Fadiga, 2002).
Brain imaging experiments in humans have shown an
important overlap between brain areas activating during
action execution and action observation. For instance, dur-
ing hand action execution and observation, a cortical net-
work involving sectors of Broca’s region, premotor
cortex, STS region and posterior parietal cortex is activated
(Decety et al., 1994; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti,
1996; Gre`zes & Decety, 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Ste-
phan et al., 1995). A recent brain imaging study (Buccino
et al., 2001) also showed that when we observe goal-related
behaviors executed with diﬀerent eﬀectors such as the
hand, the mouth or the foot, diﬀerent sectors of our premo-
tor cortex become active. These sectors are the same that
are active when we perform the same actions. In addition,
several studies indicate that, unlike in monkeys, the obser-
vation of not just transitive actions (i.e. object-directed
actions) but also of intransitive actions may produce acti-
vation of the motor cortex (Buccino et al., 2001; Fadiga,
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Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Gre`zes, Costes, & Dec-
ety, 1998). Thus, although evidence for mirror mechanisms
in humans is only indirect, the important overlap between
areas activated during action execution and during action
observation strongly suggests that many frontal and parie-
tal areas have mirror properties.1
3. What are mirror neurons for?
With these neurophysiological data in place, we can turn
to the following questions: What is it exactly that mirror
neurons encode? What purpose do they serve? In what
sense is their function diﬀerent from the function of STSa
cells coding face and body movements as goal-directed
actions? That the answers to these questions are not com-
pletely obvious can be brought out by comparing the two
competing accounts given on the one hand by Gallese
(2001, 2003b) and on the other by Knoblich and Jordan
(2002).
Gallese endorses what we might call a ‘‘maximalist’’
interpretation of mirror neurons, which consists in the fol-
lowing three main claims:
(1) What mirror neurons code is ‘‘the relationship in
motor terms between the agent and the object of the
action’’ (2003b: p. 173). More speciﬁcally the rela-
tionship in question is a dynamic interaction leading
to a certain end-state or goal.
(2) This interaction is represented independently of the
self-other distinction; in other words the interaction
is represented regardless of the identity of the agent,
self or other. It is, to use Gallese’s phrase, ‘‘we-
centric’’.
(3) Mirror neurons underlie the capacity for understand-
ing others as intentional agents pursuing goals.
In contrast, Knoblich and Jordan propose a much more
deﬂationary interpretation, which we dub ‘‘minimalist’’.
According to the minimalist interpretation, what is coded
by mirror neurons is best described as perceivable action
eﬀects. In other words, the perceived eﬀect the observed
action exerts on the object is matched to a possible eﬀect
that could be also exerted by one of the observer’s own
actions. Knoblich and Jordan also note that ‘‘one implica-
tion of the action eﬀect notion is that the kind of action
understanding the mirror system provides is ego-centered
and does not necessarily include an explicit representation
of another agent. As a consequence, organisms endowed
with a mirror system may have the ability to understand
that objects are aﬀected in a way in which they could also
aﬀect them, but they may not understand that the peer who
is producing the action is an agent like themselves’’ (Knob-
lich & Jordan, 2002). We can thus sum up the minimalist
interpretation by the following claims:
(1 0) What mirror neurons code is ‘‘the perceived eﬀect the
action exerts on the object’’ (2002: p. 116).
(2 0) This perceived eﬀect is encoded in ‘‘ego-centric’’
terms, as a type of eﬀect I can produce by performing
a certain motor act.
(3 0) The main function of mirror neurons is to increase
the tendency of the agent to reproduce the same
action (response facilitation).
To clarify the nature of the disagreement between max-
imalist and minimalist interpretations, let us introduce a
distinction between the informational content and the rep-
resentational content of mirror neurons. MNs can be con-
ceived as natural signs having an informational content.
They carry information about whatever in the world cov-
aries with their activation. Now, the kind of informational
content MNs have is not an object of dispute. Their activa-
tion covaries with the presence of an action in the subject’s
environment. More precisely, their informational content is
that an agent is interacting with an object in a speciﬁc goal-
directed manner, where the agent can be the subject herself
or another subject.2
The notion of information content should not be con-
fused with that of representational content. A natural sign
may not represent anything, and if it represents something,
it typically does not represent or (as we shall also say) artic-
ulate all the aspects of its informational content (the com-
plex event in the world its activation covaries with). The
representational content of a state is at least partly a matter
of what functions it serves in the system (Dretske, 1988).
Unlike informational content, representational content is
directly relevant to the issue of understanding. When we
know what MNs represent, we have a better idea of what
kind of action understanding they can aﬀord.
In this paper, we shall suppose that there are at least two
criteria of representation. The ﬁrst criterion is the possibil-
ity of misrepresentation. A state is a representation only if it
is produced by a system that is also capable of misrepre-
senting the world. The second criterion is the possibility
of contrast. A state represents an aspect of the world only
if it is produced by a system that is also capable of produc-
ing representations of contrasting aspects. Something is
always represented, at least implicitly, as opposed to some-
thing else.
As an illustration of how these criteria apply to MNs
(assuming of course that they have a representational1 It is important to note that mirror systems understood in a wide sense
involve more than just mirror neurons. They may include further
mechanisms that exploit mirror neuron resources together with informa-
tion from other origins. In this paper however, we will be concerned only
with mirror neurons, their contents and functions. We therefore distin-
guish between mirror systems (broad sense) and mirror neuron systems
(narrow sense).
2 Since mirror neurons will also ﬁre when a monkey is preparing to act
on a object but prevented to do it before a certain delay, it would perhaps
be more correct to say that what they encode is that an agent is interacting
or preparing to interact with an object in a goal-directed manner.
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content), consider the question of whether the time of the
action is represented in the MN system. MNs activation
covaries with currently observed, prepared or executed
actions, but are the times of actions articulated in the
system? It is diﬃcult to see how the MN system could
misrepresent the time of an action. Moreover, the system
cannot represent an action as taking place at the present
time unless it can represent an action as taking place at
other, contrasting times, in the past or in the future.
Now surely we do not want to say that the representa-
tional content of MNs is tensed. Time is thus not part
of what is represented or articulated in the mirror
system.
A more controversial issue is whether the agent is part
of the representational content of MNs. Let us examine
in more detail the opposition between the maximalist
and the minimalist interpretations, explicitly conceived
as a dispute about the representational content of mirror
neurons. According to the maximalist interpretation, mir-
ror neurons represent particular types of agent-object
relational interactions. These interactions themselves can
be further described as means-end relations, where the
end-state is a diﬀerent state of the agent (e.g. to take
possession of a piece of food, to throw away an object,
to break it, or to bring it to the mouth) and where the
means are speciﬁed in a precise or a more abstract way
depending on whether the mirror neuron in question is
strictly or broadly congruent. Furthermore, Gallese’s sec-
ond claim suggests that although the agent parameter is
part of the representational content of mirror neurons,
the identity of the agent (self or other) is not articulated.
Schematically then, in Gallese’s picture, the representa-
tional content of mirror neurons can be speciﬁed in the
following way:
An unspeciﬁed agent is performing a motor act of type M
on a target object.
In contrast, according to the minimalist interpretation,
mirror neurons represent perceivable action eﬀects, do
not include a representation of the other agent, and are
ego-centered. There are diﬀerent things this notion of
ego-centeredness could refer to.
One ﬁrst possibility is that the content of mirror-
neurons is ego-centered simply in the sense that the actions
they can represent must be part of the agent’s own motor
repertoire. This reading of ego-centeredness is not espe-
cially contentious and, presumably, Gallese would not take
issue with it.
As a second possibility, it may be that MNs are ego-cen-
tered in the sense that their function is not to understand
the actions of others but to steer the agent’s own behavior.
This is a claim explicitly made by Knoblich and Jordan.
Now, they do not distinguish between two explanations
of the fact that mirror neurons serve this function. On
one explanation the agent parameter is part of the repre-
sentational content of mirror neurons and its value is
always the self:
There is an action eﬀect of type E which I [the self] could
achieve by performing a motor act of type M.
However, given our criteria for what counts as a rep-
resentation, the claim that the self is represented in the
contents of MNs is implausible. It could only be sus-
tained if it were possible, at that level of representation,
to contrast either self with non-self or self with others. In
other words, MNs cannot represent the self as such
unless they are also capable of producing representations
with a content of the form ‘‘This (other) agent is doing
F’’, or ‘‘Non-self is doing F’’. Knoblich and Jordan
themselves acknowledge that another agent cannot be
represented as such within the MN system, and they
say nothing about the availability of a self/non-self
contrast.
Another more plausible explanation is available. For a
representation to steer the behavior of an agent, it is not
required that this representation include an explicit refer-
ence to her. To borrow a distinction from Perry (1993),
the representation might concern the agent without being
about her. When the representation merely concerns the
agent, it is self-relative without having any component
referring to the self. Perry claims that this is the case with
perceptual representations:
What each of us gets from perception may be regarded
as information concerning ourselves, to explain connec-
tions between perception and action. There is no need
for a self-referring component of our belief, no need
for an idea or representation of ourselves. When a ball
comes at me, I duck; when a milk shake is put in front
of me, I advance. The eyes that see and the torso or legs
that move are parts of the same more or less integrated
body. And this fact, external to the belief, supplies the
needed coordination (1993: p. 219).
A perceptual representation with the content ‘‘This ball
is approaching’’ might cause the agent to duck even
though it is not self-referential. The representation con-
cerns the agent in virtue of facts about her functional
architecture, in particular the fact that local perception
is causally wired to local action. Similarly, the representa-
tion ‘‘It’s raining’’ is typically not about the local weather,
but merely concerns it. What makes it concern the local
weather is the fact that the agent only uses the represen-
tation to act on the local weather, for instance by opening
her umbrella. One reason to consider these representa-
tions as self-relative rather than self-referential has to do
with the contrast criterion. At the relevant levels of repre-
sentation, the subject and the place of the represented rain
are not represented as opposed to other, real or possible
subjects and places.
If we are right, the representational content of MNs is
best speciﬁed in an agent-neutral way, for instance as
follows:
There is an eﬀect of type E achieved by performing a
motor act of type M.
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Mirror neurons with this content can be self-relative but
they need not be. Whether they are self-relative or not
depends on what they are used for. They are certainly
self-relative when they are used to steer the agent’s own
behavior. Thus, a representation can be ego-centered in
the sense that it steers the behavior of the agent to which
it belongs (self-relativity) without being ego-centered in
the more demanding sense of involving an explicit repre-
sentation of the agent as self (self-reference). We shall call
representations that do not involve an explicit reference
to an agent ‘‘a-centered’’. A-centered representations,
whether self-relative or not, are representationally indiﬀer-
ent to the distinction between self and others.
According to Gallese (2001, pp. 40-2), the MN system
may originally have developed to achieve a better control
of action performance. Canonical neurons code a motor
program for acting on a target object, and a copy of this
motor program signal is fed to mirror neurons. The motor
activity of mirror neurons acts as a sort of ‘‘simulator’’ of
the programmed action, used to predict its consequences
and thus achieve more precise control of the motor perfor-
mance. Then, the coupling of the MN system with visual
input may have allowed it to be used for diﬀerent purposes,
namely to represent other individuals’ actions. Gallese
seems to be committed to the claim that the representa-
tional content of MNs was diﬀerent when they were ﬁrst
used as eﬀerence copies – we presume that they could not
be we-centric at that stage. In contrast, we claim that the
representational content of MNs is the same at both stages,
namely agent-neutral or a-centered.
In a nutshell, a representation can be indiﬀerent to
the self/other distinction without being we-centric in
Gallese’s sense. At ﬁrst blush, indiﬀerence to the self/other
distinction may be more economically explained in terms of
a-centric representations. Gallese therefore needs further
reasons to maintain that the representational content of
MNs is we-centric. We suspect that his main reason for this
claim is his view that the MN system grounds our under-
standing of others as agents pursuing goals. For instance,
Gallese (2001, p. 35) claims that purely visual representa-
tions of a behavior (representations in the STS) do not
allow for its coding/representing as an intended, mind-
driven behavior. We agree with this claim concerning visual
representations, but, as we shall argue in Section 4.2, we
think that the same goes for motor representations in the
mirror system.
4. Four levels of action understanding
In the light of the above discussion and of further ele-
ments to be introduced shortly, it appears necessary to
distinguish at least four levels of action understanding.
Let us note at the outset that understanding an action
in the sense of having a neural representation of an action
should be distinguished from understanding an action in
the sense of having a conscious, personal-level representa-
tion of an action. The former kind of understanding can
be called implicit understanding and the latter explicit
understanding. Here we will mostly be interested in impli-
cit forms and levels of action understanding, although the
fourth level of action understanding we consider is argu-
ably one that takes place at the personal level. The four
levels we want to consider are visual understanding,
motor understanding, agentive understanding and meta-
representational understanding. We now examine each
level in turn.
4.1. Visual understanding
As shown by Perrett and his co-workers (for a review see
Perrett, 1999), several types of neurons in the STS region of
the visual system of monkeys are relevant to understanding
action. One type of cell encodes the visual appearance of
the face and body while they are static or in motion. A sec-
ond type of cell in the STS is selectively responsive to par-
ticular types of body movement but remains inactive to
static images of the body. A third type of cell responds spe-
ciﬁcally to face and body movements as goal directed
actions. As Perrett (1999) points out, the coding achieved
by the ﬁrst two types of cells can be understood with sole
reference to the visual appearance and movement of a body
or face within the visual image. Actions, however, are more
than just movements in that they involve goal-directed
behavior. One way visual information can be used to spec-
ify the goal-directed nature of movement is by relating
body movements to other aspects of the visual environ-
ment. Movement coding thus becomes action coding. This
type of coding is precisely what cells of the third type
achieve.
For instance, cells in the ventral bank of the STS are
selectively responsive to hand actions, with diﬀerent sub-
populations of these cells showing selectivity for speciﬁc
hand-object interactions, such as reaching for, retrieving,
manipulating, holding or tearing (Perrett et al., 1989).
These cells respond when both the appropriate hand move-
ments and the appropriate movements of the object acted
upon are visible. Furthermore, the hand movements and
the object movements must be appropriately related. For
instance cells responsive to object manipulation do not
respond to the sight of the hand movements combined with
object movements when the hand and object are spatially
separated by a few centimeters (Perrett et al., 1989).
According to Perrett, this indicates that the cells are sensi-
tive to the causal relation (in the form of spatial contiguity)
between eﬀector and object acted upon. One further impor-
tant property of these cells is that they generalize across
several diﬀerent instances of the same action, including
the sight of the action from diﬀerent perspectives, at diﬀer-
ent distances or speeds, performed on diﬀerent objects, per-
formed by the monkey’s own hand as well as by other
hands.
This makes it possible to claim that actions and not just
movements are represented and classiﬁed by cell popula-
tions in the STS. Importantly, goal-directedness, the
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distinguishing feature of actions as opposed to mere move-
ments, is represented in terms of speciﬁc spatial relations
between biological movements (of an agent) and other
aspects of the visual environment (an object, another indi-
vidual or a place in the environment). As emphasized by
Perrett (1999), the kind of action understanding made pos-
sible by the visual coding of actions achieved by the STS is
behavioral rather than mentalistic. It makes possible the
formation of learned associations between visually coded
actions and their visual consequences. Exploitation of these
learned associations makes it possible to predict the visual
consequences of the seen action.
4.2. Motor understanding
The main diﬀerence between the kind of visual under-
standing instantiated by STS-neurons and the motor
understanding found at the level of MNs is that the action
(movement + goal) that was encoded in STS in visuo-spa-
tial terms is now motorically encoded; i.e. encoded in terms
of the motor commands necessary to achieve the goal. For
instance, whereas hand movements are represented in STS
in terms of spatial conﬁgurations and spatial transitions
(rotations, translations) among them, they are represented
by MNs in terms of speciﬁc motor programs.
What are the beneﬁts of a motor understanding of
actions? As we have seen, according to the hypothetical sce-
nario proposed by Gallese (Fogassi & Gallese, 2002; Gal-
lese, 2001), the motor activity of mirror neurons could be
interpreted as the result of an eﬀerence copy signal of the
motor program encoded by canonical neurons. This system
may originally have developed to achieve better control of
action performance, and its later coupling with visual input
may have allowed it to be used to represent others’ actions.
If the system initially developed to predict the consequences
of the agent’s own actions, one immediate beneﬁt of its
being coupled with visual input would be to allow it to pre-
dict the consequences of observed actions on the basis of its
‘‘knowledge’’ of the consequences of its own actions.
As suggested by Knoblich and Jordan, another beneﬁt
of the motor understanding of observed actions and their
consequences would be to help the observer react appropri-
ately. In some instances, the appropriate reaction would be
to perform a similar action. For instance prepare to grasp
for a piece of food when observing another agent doing the
same thing. The activation of mirror neurons during action
observation would therefore serve a motor function. Riz-
zolatti et al. (2001) dismiss this interpretation as unlikely,
pointing that ‘‘when the monkey observes another monkey
grasping a piece of food, the obvious action to take would
be for instance to approach the other monkey, but certainly
not to repeat the observed action’’ (2001, p. 667). Of
course, if ‘‘repeating the observed action’’ is taken in a very
narrow sense, performing the very same action on the very
same object, they are right. But if it is taken in a broader
sense, producing an action of a similar type, it could make
perfect sense at least in ecological conditions. Peanuts may
become available only one at a time in a laboratory setting,
but when monkeys are foraging in the wild, it would make
sense for a monkey observing another monkey picking a
berry to prepare for the same action as presumably other
berries are to be found in the vicinity. Similarly, the kind
of broad congruence of MNs that was described in Section
2 as logical or causal congruence suggests that the motor
understanding of observed actions may have as one of its
functions to prepare an appropriate response. In the exam-
ple given by Fogassi and Gallese (2002), to prepare to
grasp a piece of food, when observing an experimenter
placing it on a tray.
4.3. Agentive understanding
To illustrate the contrast between agentive and both per-
ceptual and motor understanding, consider the following
passage by Tomasello (1999):
Nonhuman primates see a conspeciﬁc moving toward
food and may infer, based on past experience, what is
likely to happen next, and they may even use intelligent
and insightful strategies to aﬀect what happens next. But
human beings see something diﬀerent. They see a con-
speciﬁc as trying to obtain the food as a goal, and they
can attempt to aﬀect this and other intentional and men-
tal states, not just behaviour. (1999, p. 21)
Visual understanding of action can be described as the
understanding of speciﬁc spatio-temporal relations among
external events, where the antecedent event is one of bio-
logical motion. Motor understanding of actions is under-
standing of actions as motor procedures that produce
certain eﬀects. Visual and motor representations of
actions may thus at best underlie an understanding of
agents as self-propelled beings that make things happen.
But an agentive understanding of action is something dif-
ferent. It involves understanding the more complex rela-
tionships between an agent with a goal, the instrumental
means used and the eﬀects produced. In eﬀect, it involves
moving from intentionality-in-the-world to agent-inten-
tionality, from goals as relational structures in the world
to goals as intentional relations between agents and the
world.
We claim that this kind of understanding requires mech-
anisms and representational skills beyond those found at
the level of the MN system. One line of evidence for this
claim is the fact that, as the majority of primatologists
now seem to agree, agentive understanding of actions
and understanding of others as intentional agents is unique
to humans (Povinelli, 2001; Povinelli, Perilloux, Reaux, &
Beirschwale, 1998; Premack, 1986; Tomasello, 1999). For
instance, chimpanzees do not appear able to discriminate
between intentional and non-intentional actions. Since,
however, MN systems are not unique to humans but are
also found in apes and monkeys, it is diﬃcult to main-
tain that they provide a suﬃcient basis for agentive
understanding.
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According to Tomasello (1999), what non-human pri-
mates lack is the ability to understand goals and behavioral
means as separable in the actions of others. In the absence
of this ability, they ‘‘focus on the changes of state (includ-
ing changes of spatial position) of the objects involved dur-
ing the demonstration [of actions involving tool use], with
the actions of the demonstrator being in eﬀect just other
physical motions. The intentional state of the demonstra-
tor, and thus her behavioral methods as distinct behavioral
entities, are simply not part of their experience’’ (1999, pp.
30–31). Indeed, the way MNs encode actions is by repre-
senting the goal in terms of the motoric means used to
achieve it. Thus, at this level goals and means cannot be
represented separately.
A genuine agentive understanding of action requires a
representational redescription of the action, where goals
and means are represented separately, thus making it pos-
sible to represent agents as directed towards goals indepen-
dently of the means employed and to understand the
intentional relation of the agent to the goal as the mediat-
ing force that explains the means-end sequence. Once the
agent parameter is articulated as a separate component
of the representation of the action, further attribution
mechanisms can come into play to determine the value of
the agent parameter (self vs. non-self or self vs. other).3
4.4. Meta-representational understanding
By meta-representational understanding, we mean the
kind of understanding of an action that relates it not just
to the immediate intention or goal the agent is striving to
achieve, but to his or her reasons for pursuing that goal.
This kind of understanding of action involves attributing
to agents beliefs and desires that rationalize their intentions
and actions. It therefore requires the possession of concepts
of beliefs, desires and other mental states. These meta-
representational skills and the kind of understanding of
action they make possible are unique to humans.
We call this level ‘‘meta-representational’’ not because we
think that the level of agentive understanding does not
involve representations of mental states, namely intentions,
but because the fourth level involves representations that are
more complex in at least two ways. First, it may be argued
that the mental states that are represented at the third level
are relational, i.e. they involve relations of an agent to a goal
in the world, whereas the meta-representational level is con-
cerned with propositional attitudes that cannot always be
construed as relations to the world. Second, at the meta-
representational level of understanding, the focus is on the
relations between intentions and other mental states that
rationalize them. Indeed, much recent developmental litera-
ture suggests that the child masters an agentive understand-
ing of actions much before he develops a full-blown
meta-representational understanding of them (Bartsch &
Wellmann, 1995; Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001).
5. Joint action: classical analyses and their limitations
In the broadest sense, the label ‘‘collective actions’’ can
be used to cover all cases where a certain global eﬀect is
the result of the actions of several individuals. Creating
a traﬃc jam is a collective action in this sense, as one sin-
gle motorist does not suﬃce to create a traﬃc jam. Note,
though, that this is a collective action in the weakest pos-
sible sense, since it is not even required that the participat-
ing agents share a goal, much less that they cooperate to
achieve that goal. At the other end of the spectrum of col-
lective actions are joint cooperative actions. An instance
of joint cooperative action would be jazz musicians
involved in a jam session. Here, the participating agents
share the same goal, creating a new version of a jazz stan-
dard; they act towards that shared goal by playing their
parts and they cooperate by adjusting their individual per-
formance to the performance of other members of the
band to achieve the common goal. There are various inter-
mediate cases between collective action in the weak sense
described above and joint cooperative actions. Here we
will focus on the latter kind of actions, joint actions for
short.
To help bring to the fore what is distinctive of joint
actions, let us consider the following example by Searle:
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in
various places in a park. Imagine that it suddenly starts
to rain and they all get up and run to a common, cen-
trally located shelter. Each person has the intention
expressed by the sentence ‘‘I am running to the shelter’’.
But for each person, we may suppose that his or her
intention is entirely independent of the intentions and
behaviour of others. In this case there is no collective
behaviour; there is just a sequence of individual acts that
happens to converge on a common goal. Now imagine a
case where a group of people in a park converge on a
common point as a piece of collective behaviour. Imag-
ine that they are part of an outdoor ballet where the
choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to con-
verge on a common point. We can imagine that the
external bodily movements are indistinguishable in the
two cases; the people running to the shelter make the
same types of bodily movements as the ballet dancers.
Externally observed, the two cases are indistinguishable,
but they are clearly internally diﬀerent. (Searle, 1990,
pp. 402–403)
The problem then is to specify what this internal diﬀer-
ence consists in. One important clue is that in the ﬁrst sit-
uation the convergence on a common goal is a mere
accident. The intention and behavior of each individual
are entirely independent of the intentions and behavior of
others. Moreover, as Searle remarks, this is so even if each
person knows that the other people intend to run to the
3 For discussions of the possible forms attribution mechanisms could
take, see Georgieﬀ and Jeannerod (1998) and Jeannerod and Pacherie
(2004).
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shelter and knows that the other people know that he or
she intends to run to the shelter. Searle claims that in the
second situation, by contrast, the individual ‘‘I intentions’’
are derivative from ‘‘we-intentions’’.
A second reason for thinking that collective intentional
behavior is not the same as the summation of individual
intentional behavior is that ‘‘often the derived form of an
individual intention will have a diﬀerent content from the
collective intention from which it is derived’’ (Searle,
1990, p. 403). The example Searle gives is that of a football
team trying to execute a pass play. No individual member
of the team can have ‘‘we are executing a pass play’’ as the
entire content of his intention, for no one can execute a
pass play by himself. Each player must make a speciﬁc con-
tribution to the overall goal.
Saying that what is distinctive of joint actions is that
they involve we-intentions does little more than give the
problem a name, as long as one does not specify what
we-intentions consist in. We will here consider two analyses
of we-intentions, proposed respectively by Searle (1990)
and Bratman (1992) and point out some of their
shortcomings.
According to Searle, we-intentions cannot be analyzed
into sets of I-intentions, even supplemented with beliefs,
including mutual beliefs about the intentions of other
members of a group. Analyses that attempt such a reduc-
tion fail to account for the cooperative and coordinated
character of joint actions. Searle shows through counter-
examples that the existence of mutual beliefs among mem-
bers of a group is not suﬃcient to ensure cooperation.
Thus, business school graduates who have been exposed
to Adam Smith’s theory of the hidden hand may come to
believe that the best way for somebody to help humanity
is by pursuing his own selﬁsh interests. Each may form a
separate intention to thus help humanity by pursuing his
own selﬁsh interests and not cooperating with anybody
and they may all have mutual beliefs to the eﬀect that each
has such an intention. In such a case, despite all the busi-
nessmen having the same goal as well as mutual beliefs
about their respective intentions, there is no cooperation
and no collective action. What they lack is an intention
to cooperate mutually. Mutual beliefs among members of
a group do not ensure the presence of such an intention.
According to Searle, this cooperative dimension of col-
lective actions can be captured only if it is accepted that
the intentions attributable to the individuals that take part
in collective actions are diﬀerent in type from the intentions
attributable to those same individuals when they engage in
individual actions. The idea then is that to account for
cooperation we have to introduce a speciﬁc type of mental
states: we-intentions. What needs to be spelled out is the
sense in which we-intentions are special and, relatedly,
the sense in which they can be said to imply cooperation.
Prima facie, there are three possibilities. The ﬁrst is that
what makes we-intentions special has to do with the type
of entities they can be attributed to. The second is that
what makes them special are features of their contents
and thus that the dimension of cooperation is linked to spe-
ciﬁc features of these contents. Finally the third possibility
is that rather than the contents or the possible bearers of
we-intentions, it is the psychological mode itself – i.e., the
fact that the psychological mode is that of we-intending
instead of I-intending – that implies the notion of cooper-
ation. Before we examine each possibility in turn, let us
note that they are not mutually incompatible: we-inten-
tions could in principle be special in all three ways.
Searle rejects the ﬁrst option on the ground that it would
force one to admit the existence of some forms of primitive
collective entities, an ontological commitment he sees as
unreasonable. He also rejects the second option, claiming
that the content of we-intentions is of a form already pres-
ent in some complex cases of singular intentions, the con-
tent of which encompasses a by-means-of relation. The
idea is that in the case of singular intention of, e.g., ﬁring
a gun by pulling the trigger, there is only one intention
and one action, with the relation of the means-intention
to the overall intention being only part-whole. Similarly,
for Searle, in the case of collective actions, there is only
one complex: the singular intentions of the participating
agents are related to the collective intention as means to
ends and this relation is simply part-whole. To borrow
Searle’s example of two cooks, say Paul and Gilbert, pre-
paring a hollandaise sauce together, the content of Paul’s
we-intention would be something like ‘‘that we make the
sauce by means of me steering’’ and the content of Gilbert’s
intention could be rendered as ‘‘that we make the sauce by
means of me pouring’’. It is important to note that there is
nothing in the by-means-of relation per se that implies
cooperation. For instance, I can intend that we go to the
police station by means of me dragging you, and clearly
in such a case no cooperation need be involved. Thus, there
is nothing in the analysis Searle oﬀers of the form of the
content of collective intentions that makes it necessary that
the dimension of cooperation essential to collective inten-
tions be reﬂected in their contents.
The option Searle favors is the third one, namely, that
what makes we-intentions special is the psychological mode
itself, not the possible subjects of we-intentions nor their
contents. More speciﬁcally, what is special about we-inten-
tions is that they are mental states that ‘‘make reference to
collectives where the reference to the collective lies outside
the bracket that speciﬁes the propositional content of the
intentional state’’ (Searle, 1990, p. 408).
One problematic feature in Searle’s analysis has to do
with the dimension of cooperation that he says is essential
to joint action. Nothing in the structure of the content of
we-intentions as laid out by Searle seems to capture the
notion of cooperation. As we have already noted, there is
nothing in the by-means-of relation per se that implies
cooperation. According to Searle, in order to account for
the cooperative character of we-intentions, we must appeal
to Background capacities. What collective intentionality
presupposes is ‘‘a Background sense of the other as a can-
didate for cooperative agency; that is, it presupposes a
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sense of others as more than mere conscious agents, indeed
as actual or potential members of a cooperative activity’’
(Searle, 1990, p. 414). Background capacities, according
to Searle, are not themselves representational. Rather, they
are a set of non-intentional or preintentional capacities that
enable intentional states to function. In other words,
they are biological or neurophysiological phenomena
rather than intentional phenomena. Yet, by drawing a line
between the realm of the intentional and the Background
and by considering that the dimension of cooperation is
part of the Background, Searle acknowledges that he can-
not account for it in intentional terms.
While there is no denying that all our cognitive capaci-
ties rest on an underlying basis of biological capacities, it
seems both unduly hasty to sweep cooperation under the
rug of Background presuppositions and controversial to
claim that the required background capacities are non-rep-
resentational. Although a capacity for cooperation may
depend in part on certain background biological capacities,
we shall try to show later that these background capacities
can be spelled out in part in representational terms.
But ﬁrst let us consider Bratman’s attempt at capturing
the cooperative dimension of joint action. Bratman agrees
with Searle that collective intentional behaviour is not ana-
lyzable as just the summation of individual intentional
behavior even supplemented with mutual beliefs or mutual
knowledge. Yet, contrary to Searle, he thinks that collec-
tive intentionality is not a primitive phenomenon and that
a non-circular reductive analysis may be possible. Bratman
(1992) identiﬁes three features of joint actions (which he
calls shared cooperative activities) that such an analysis
would have to account for. The ﬁrst feature is a commit-
ment to a joint activity (e.g. we paint the house together).
The second is the mutual responsiveness of each participat-
ing agent to the intentions and actions of the others. The
third is a commitment to mutual support by which each
agent is committed to supporting the eﬀorts of the other
to play her role in the joint activity. None of these features
is by itself suﬃcient to make an activity a joint action, but,
according to Bratman, taken together these three features
are characteristic of joint actions.
Bratman is careful to ensure that his analysis is non-cir-
cular. In this regard the notion of a commitment to a joint
activity may seem suspect. However, Bratman makes it
clear that in his analysis the notion of a joint activity
should be understood in a cooperatively neutral way. Sec-
ond, one may wonder whether it makes sense to appeal to
my intention that we do something together, insofar as it
may be thought that one can only intend one’s own
actions. Here, Bratman introduces a distinction between
intending and attempting and defends a planning concep-
tion of intentions that emphasizes the role of future-direc-
ted intentions as elements of partial plans. This conception
of intentions allows him to be more liberal about what can
be intended than about what can be attempted since refer-
ences to things other than our own actions can function
appropriately in our plans.
Since Bratman construes commitment to a joint activity
in a cooperatively neutral way, this commitment does not
suﬃce to ensure that the activity that follows is a shared
cooperative activity or a collective action in Searle’s sense.
The originality of Bratman’s analysis comes from the way
in which he construes the two further features of mutual
responsiveness and commitment to mutual support. These
are analyzed in terms of meshing subplans and interdepen-
dent intentions. For an activity to be a shared cooperative
activity, it must be the case that each agent intends that
the group performs this joint action in accordance with
subplans that mesh, where for subplans tomesh it is not nec-
essary that there be full agreement in the agents’ subplans,
but merely that there be some way the action can be done
that would involve the successful execution of those individ-
ual subplans. This meshing of subplans in turn implies that
the intentions of the participating agents must be interlock-
ing. Each agent should bring into the content of his inten-
tion the eﬃcacy of the other participants’ intentions as
well as the eﬃcacy of his own intentions. By thus requiring
that the intentions of the participating agents be interlock-
ing, Bratman moves away from the classical reductive anal-
yses of collective action according to which the crucial link
among the attitudes of the participating agents is simply
cognitive. Mutual belief or mutual knowledge are not suﬃ-
cient to ensure that an intention is shared or collective; but
neither is it necessary to posit collective intentionality as a
primitive form of intentionality. What is crucial is the spe-
ciﬁc form of interdependence of the individual intentions.
Finally, insofar as the intention of each participant includes
his intending that the relevant intentions of the others be
successfully executed, commitment tomutual support is also
involved in shared cooperative activities. As Bratman
phrases it, the intentions of the participants should be min-
imally cooperatively stable. In other words, there must be at
least some circumstances in which each participant would be
prepared to help the others do their part in the joint activity.
Bratman’s analysis may be judged more satisfactory
than Searle’s. It does not lay open to the criticism Searle
addresses to traditional reductive analyses of collective
intentionality since it does not maintain that the crucial
link among the attitudes of agents involved in collective
behaviour is a purely cognitive link. It brings to the fore
three essential features of shared intentions that are not
taken into account by traditional analyses. Finally, con-
trary to Searle, it tries to capture what is distinctive of
shared intentions in terms of a special kind of interdepen-
dence among the individual intentions of the participants,
rather than by postulating a mysterious form of primitive
we-intentionality supposed to be in the head of individual
agents. Thus, according to Bratman, the contents of the
intentions of individuals involved in collective action are
special insofar as they make reference to the intentions of
the other participants – each agent must have intentions
in favour of the eﬃcacy of the intentions of the others –
and are self-reﬂexive as well – each agent must have inten-
tions concerning the eﬃcacy of his or her own intentions.
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Despite its illuminating character, Bratman’s analysis is
not totally unproblematic. The characterization he pro-
poses seems tailored to forms of joint actions that are
already rather sophisticated. His analysis focuses on
future-directed intentions that involve rational deliberation
and conscious planning. It also requires that the participat-
ing agents have the concept of an intention, since the con-
tents of their intentions make reference to the intentions of
the other participants. One may therefore wonder how
more elementary forms of joint action, that may not
involve prior rational deliberation and conscious planning,
and that may indeed be performed by creatures that do not
possess meta-representational capacities and do not have
the concept of an intention, could be accounted for.
Our purpose in the last section will therefore be to
explore the contrast between the sophisticated joint actions
that are the target of Bratman’s analysis and more elemen-
tary forms of joint actions that may not require the com-
plex cognitive machinery implied by his analysis. We will
try to characterize the role MN representations may play
in an account of what makes elementary or sophisticated
joint actions possible. We think, contrary to Searle, that
the Background underlying joint action can be character-
ized at least in part in representational terms. We will try
to show that the cooperative features of shared intentions
have a partial analogue at the subpersonal level.
6. What MNs can and cannot explain about joint action
Various species of social mammals engage in types of
joint behaviour that involve some form of cooperation
and coordination among participants. A well-known exam-
ple is group-hunting in lions, wolves or chimpanzees.
Although human beings are clearly capable of more sophis-
ticated forms of joint activity, they also engage in unreﬂec-
tive joint actions that may share many of the features of
other mammals’ collaborative endeavors.
It therefore seems useful to draw a distinction between
elementary or thin forms of joint action common to
humans and other social mammals and sophisticated or
thick forms of joint action, perhaps unique to the human
species. We suggest that this distinction can be understood
as a distinction between forms of joint action that require
only a capacity for a perceptual and a motor understanding
of action and forms of joint actions that also require a
capacity for an agentive and a meta-representational
understanding of action. We also want to suggest that
actions of the former type involve cooperation without rep-
resentation, in the sense that the participating agents need
not represent the activity they take part in as a cooperative
venture, hence need not represent the other participants’
intentions and the relations these intentions bear to their
own intentions. In contrast, joint actions of the latter type
require the interlocking complexes of intentions described
by Bratman. Finally, we think the cooperative features
exhibited by thin joint actions may be explained in terms
of subpersonal mechanisms of coordination in a way that
gives MN representations a central role, while the role
MN representations play in thick forms of joint actions
may be more marginal.4
To illustrate the way in which action coordination may
be achieved through the use of simple perceptual and
motor representations, let us consider a model proposed
by Knoblich and Jordan (2002). They argue that although
the simple kind of perception-action match provided by
MNs will not allow just by itself an individual to success-
fully coordinate his or her actions with those of others, it
need only be supplemented with a representation of the
joint action eﬀects and a simple coordination mechanism
to achieve this purpose. This additional machinery will
make it possible for the individual to modulate his or her
own actions in response to perceiving the eﬀects of the oth-
ers’ actions. Knoblich and Jordan’s model requires sepa-
rate representations of joint action eﬀects and individual
action eﬀects. As shown in Fig. 1, the joint and individual
action eﬀects are coupled by excitatory or inhibitory con-
nections. These connections ensure that if there is an action
of one’s own which can increase the joint action eﬀect, it
will be triggered irrespective of who is responsible for the
joint eﬀect. Conversely, one’s own action is inhibited if it
hinders the production of an intended joint eﬀect.
In this model, joint intentions at the level of the joint
action system are represented in purely perceptual terms
4 Note that the majority of human actions are probably hybrids of thin
and thick actions with some aspects of the cooperative endeavor being
explicitly represented – generally, the more global ones –, and others
supported by subpersonal mechanisms of coordination. Another impor-
tant characteristic of human joint actions is their heavy reliance on
conventions and coordination devices, i.e. artefacts whose main function is
to facilitate coordination. One clear example would be the set of
conventions known as the Highway Code and the various artefacts (traﬃc
lights, road signs, road markings, etc.) that help drivers coordinate their
actions, while limiting the cognitive load involved in this coordination
game. It is presumably simpler to stop when the traﬃc light is red than to
try and ﬁgure out what the intentions of the drivers coming from other
directions are.
Perceptual input
Motor system
+ + 
_ _
Mirror System
(Individual
Action Effects) _ _
Motor system
Joint Action
System
(Joint Effects) Mirror System
(Individual
Action Effects)
+ + 
Agent A Agent B 
Fig. 1. The model of action coordination proposed by Knoblich and
Jordan (2002).
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and do not intrinsically exploit the MN system. The MN
system is used to represent the individual actions of the
participating agents. Therefore only perceptual and motor
understanding of action are involved. Cooperation, in the
form of action coordination, is achieved without being rep-
resented or intended as such. There is no commitment to a
joint activity in the sense of a shared intention that we, say,
catch the prey together, but simply a goal or intended
action eﬀect that agents happen to share, say, that the prey
be caught. The mutual responsiveness and mutual support
characteristic of thick joint action here simply translate as
the modulation of one’s own actions in response to perceiv-
ing the eﬀects of a peer’s action.
Such a model has serious limitations and cannot be a
model of thick joint actions. First, the fact that there is a
joint action is not essential to the model. For all it says,
the joint eﬀects might be the result of the agent’s action
(e.g. sailing) together with non-agentive forces (e.g. the
wind). Second, the essential cooperative dimension of thick
joint action is not present. As the join action unfolds, what
each participant agent does is simply assess the situation –
joint action eﬀects – and decide what to do next. Third, the
complementarity of the individual actions of participating
agents reduces to either continue carrying out one’s action
if this increases the desired joint eﬀect (excitatory connec-
tion) or stop carrying out one’s action if it decreases the
probability of the desired joint eﬀect (inhibitory connec-
tion). In contrast to thin joint actions, thick or sophisti-
cated joint actions require representations not just of
actions and their eﬀects, but also of agents and their inten-
tions. Their three main features – commitment to a joint
activity, mutual responsiveness and mutual support –
require that subjects form representations that make expli-
cit reference to themselves as well as to other participating
agents. Thus, we must both intend that we J together, that
we J by means of me A-ing and you B-ing, that I help you
B-ing and you help me A-ing if necessary. The reﬂexivity
and interlocking character of shared intentions require that
each agent bring into the content of his or her own inten-
tions the eﬃcacy of the other participants’ intentions.
Obviously, MN representations are not up to such a rep-
resentational challenge. As we argued in Section 3, they do
not involve an explicit agent-parameter – they are a-cen-
tered – and they do not represent intentions but motor acts
and their eﬀects. But to say that MN representations do
not provide a suﬃcient basis for a capacity for thick joint
actions is not to say that they are useless. The a-centered-
ness of MN representations, hence their agent-neutrality,
may be a limitation but is may also be considered a
strength in some respects. First, the agent-neutrality of
MN representations makes it possible to use them as the
building blocks of the representation of the joint action
sequence and thus to test its coherence while abstracting
away from the division of labor among participants. Sec-
ond, the coherence of the whole instrumental sequence is
not represented once and for all; it is actively maintained
in the course of the joint action. As Pierre Livet (1994)
has pointed out, to engage in a joint action is to be pre-
pared to correct mistakes made by other participants,
hence to allow for modiﬁcations of our own actions in
response to others’ errors or failed actions. A system pro-
ducing agent-neutral motor representations, and producing
them online, might be useful at this point. Each agent can
represent the instrumental sequence in a way that allows
for an adjustment both of the sequence itself and of the
division of labor among participants. The two functions
Gallese assigns to MNs – better control of one’s own
actions and understanding of the actions of others – can
give rise to a third function: joint action control, where
each agent adjusts his own actions as a function of the
common goal and of the predicted consequences of the
actions of other participants.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we defended two main claims. Our ﬁrst
claim is that a maximalist interpretation of the representa-
tional content of mirror neurons is not warranted. Mirror
neurons do not represent agents as such and cannot
directly ground an agentive understanding of action. Our
second, more positive, claim is that MNs can nevertheless
play an important role in the explanation of joint actions.
First, MN representations can help explain how creatures
lacking both an agentive and a meta-representational
understanding of actions may nevertheless engage in thin
forms of joint actions. Second, a minimalist interpretation
of the representational content of mirror neurons, far from
limiting their usefulness, can yield a better account of the
production and understanding of joint action. In particu-
lar, the agent-neutrality or a-centeredness of mirror neu-
rons representations makes them plausible constituents of
the representation of a joint action sequence and useful ele-
ments in a process of online mutual adjustment of partici-
pants’ actions.
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